NSA and TIA

With all the recent attention on the National Security Agency's surveillance program--particularly that it was the so-called "data mining" aspects that drew Alberto Gonzales and Andrew Card to John Ashcroft's hospital room back in 2004--I thought it was a good time to recall a story I wrote last summer.

This story goes into considerable detail about the NSA program, as well as DARPA's Total Information Awareness. It gives a lot of the shared history of these two programs, and it offers the views of some key senior intelligence officials.

Labels: Director of National Intelligence, National Security Agency, NSA surveillance, Total Information Awareness

Shane Harris | Tuesday, July 31, 2007

Can the government spy on foreign communications inside the United States?

Members of the House Intelligence Committee have been engaged in a boisterous debate the past few days over how to change the law that governs electronic surveillance. Republicans are calling for an overhaul backed by the Director of National Intelligence, and Democrats are pushing back, saying that the administration's proposed changes would eliminate many of the current checks-and-balances on the intelligence agencies.

In the latest round, ranking member Pete Hoekstra (R-Mich.) took issue with Democrats' position that the inelligence law does not need to be amended to allow monitoring of foreign persons who are not in the United States. At first glance, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act would seem only to govern surveillance conducted on U.S. persons inside the United States. (That's the Democrats' contention, too.)

But the Republicans have a different view, which--if you closely read a letter Hoekstra sent yesterday to committee chairman Silvestre Reyes (D-Tx)--sheds more light on the particulars about how the government is conducting electronic surveillance.

"You claim that FISA does not require a court order for communications between foreign targets outside the United States. This does not fully or accurately state the law with respect to FISA, and your position would place intelligence community personnel at potential risk of criminal liability if they were to operate outside of FISA without clear legal authority."

If they were to operate outside FISA without clear legal authority. How would intelligence community personnel operate outside FISA? Hoekstra explains:

"Not all of our intelligence is collected under the specific provision of law you mention, and in any event our personnel need clear and binding legal authority in order to obtain cooperation and to have full assurance that their activities are lawful."

FISA isn't the only provision that allows electronic surveillance. The president's authorization of the National Security Agency's warrantless surveillance program also allows it. In addition, Executive Order 12333 gives the intelligence agencies authorities to collect information inside the United States under specific circumstances. But key in on the last bit of Hoekstra's comments: "in order to obtain cooperation and to have full assurance that their activities are lawful."

Does Hoekstra mean cooperation from telecommunications companies? Quite possibly. Why is that important?

"Wiretapping" is no longer a matter of climbing up a telephone pole and putting a bug on the line. The government cannot intercept communications without access to telecom networks--i.e. "cooperation."

The majority of the world's telecom infrastructure is in the United States. We are a hub of global communications. Theoretically, a terrorist in Pakistan e-mailing another terrorist in Algeria could have his message routed through New Jersey. The Republicans seem to be arguing that, under FISA, intercepting that communication inside the United States violates the law, even though the parties to said e-mail reside in foreign countries. The question is, does it violate FISA to grab a "foreign" communication as it passes through our "domestic" infrastructure?

The telecom companies have asked for a a kind of legal immunity for cooperating with government surveillance. Congress has been debating that provision. Hokestra's comments seem to reflect the companies' anxiety that they might technically be violating FISA if they allow the government to intercept communications by foreign parties on equipment based in the United States.

We've seen threads of this theory before, and the debate is no secret. But the war of words between Democrats and Republicans over how to change FISA has been particularly hot this week. This latest salvo by Hokestra is a strong indication that this question over whether, or how, to allow surveillance of foreign persons "inside" the United States is a major sticking point in the FISA reform debate.

Labels: National Security Agency, NSA surveillance, Politics, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Friday, July 27, 2007

Senators ask for full report on runaway TB patient

Sens. Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.), Susan Collins (R-Maine), and Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) have asked the Government Accountability Office for a detailed report on the case of Andrew Speaker, the Georgia man who was able to slip back into the United States, through Canada, even though federal health and security officials thought he was infected with an extremely drug-resistant strain of tuberculosis.

Lieberman, who chairs the Senate committee overseeing the Homeland Security Department, and his colleagues sent a letter yesterday to GAO chief David Walker, asking for a "thorough chronological account of the significant events and communications that occurred..." The incident "raises questions not only about events that transpired...but in the federal government’s overall approach to safeguarding our nation from public health threats before they reach our borders," the Senators wrote.

Speaker's case also raised serious questions about how the federal government has adapted to the specific nature of terrorists threats--namely, that terrorists do not behave rationally and frequently engage in unpredictable behavior. Speaker was no terrorist--and as it turns out, he had a less-serious form of TB than previously thought--but many of his evasive actions, to include entering the United States through Canada in an apparent attempt to avoid detection by U.S. authorities, shed a light on the government's terrorism responses. At many points in the tale, officials seemed to think that Speaker would behave rationally and not try to slip past them.

The full text of the senators letter follows:

July 24, 2007

The Honorable David Walker, Comptroller General
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Walker,

The recent case involving Andrew Speaker’s putative extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) has exposed a disturbing picture of the federal government’s ability to respond to a known public health incident and protect our homeland security. Thankfully it appears unlikely that this incident has resulted in the infection of more individuals with TB, but we must determine exactly what went wrong and do all that we can to ensure this does not happen again. The miscommunication, insufficient coordination and the ultimate response on the part of the agencies involved are troubling.

We, like many others, are concerned by the public health threat posed by both XDR-TB and multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), and we believe the events of the past few weeks highlight the lack of preparedness on the part of our government in responding to a public health incident. Although both XDR-TB and MDR-TB make up less than 2% of the over 13,000 cases of tuberculosis reported in the United States on an annual basis, they present a grave public health threat. In addition to the individual threat that is posed by drug-resistant TB, this incident goes to the heart of our nation’s response to serious public health threats.

Mr. Speaker’s ability to cross our borders raises questions not only about events that transpired at that inland port but in the federal government’s overall approach to safeguarding our nation from public health threats before they reach our borders.

We should never again have a situation where delays and failures in communication between the federal government, other domestic public health officials and relevant commercial entities lead to needless exposure and risk. We need to assure the American people that our government can respond in a coordinated manner to these types of public health incidents. This incident should serve as a wake-up call that we need to establish and exercise effective plans to deal with the travel of known public health threats.

To help us better understand this incident, we would like GAO to (1) review and describe the sequence of events, establishing a thorough chronological account of the significant events and communications that occurred, and (2) assess the sequence to answer the following questions:

* To what extent did responsible federal agencies and other key organizations--including CDC, DHS, DOT, and relevant state and local health departments, international health organizations, foreign governments, and airlines--have plans, protocols, agreements, and processes in place to provide for effective coordination and information sharing and for prompt notification and response to the incident?
* To what extent were these followed?
* What information systems, databases, and networks were used in responding to this incident? To what extent did they provide needed information in a timely manner?
* What lessons learned did the incident reveal about the systems, processes, and protocols used to respond and how are agencies integrating these lessons learned to prevent future such incidents? What quarantine protocols or procedures are applicable to similar incidents? How are agencies safeguarding civil liberties when implementing changes?

As you proceed with this study, we ask that GAO apprise us of any external impairment that could potentially delay its completion in a timely manner. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact us or our staff.

Sincerely,

Joseph I. Lieberman
United States Senator

Susan M. Collins
United States Senator

Hillary Rodham Clinton
United States Senator

Labels: Homeland Security, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Wednesday, July 25, 2007

Why was Al Gonzales in John Ashcroft's hospital room?

That's what Senators want to know. Gonzales is testifying right now before the Judiciary Committee--not exactly his favorite audience--about a host of issues. But earlier, Senators grilled him over the famous nighttime visit Gonzales and then White House Chief of Staff Andy Card paid to John Ashcroft, back in March 2004, when the attorney general was gravely ill and sedated at George Washington University Hospital.

Ashcroft's attorney general designate, Jim Comey, provided riveting blow-by-blow details of the event during his own testimony a few months ago, and told senators that he thought Gonzales and Card were trying to take advantage of Ashcroft's weakened state in order to get him to sign-off on a reauthorization of the National Security Agency's warrantless surveillance program.

No, no, no...big misunderstanding, Gonzales said this morning. "We went there because we thought it was important for [Ashcroft] to know where the congressional leadership was on this," Gonzales told Senators. He said that lawmakers from both parties had urged him and Card to ensure that the NSA program--which Gonzales didn't actually identify in his testimony--was re-approved before a pending expiration deadline. (As an aside, you could count on two hands the number of lawmakers who actually knew the program existed.) The way Gonzales tells it, he and Card were just there to bring Ashcroft up to speed on Congress' thinking.

The senators are finding this hard to believe, given Comey's account. He said that not only did the White House call over to Aschroft's hospital room and inform his wife that Card and Gonzales were on the way--and Comey seems to recall that that call may have come from President Bush himself--but that when the two men showed up, they were carrying an envelope, in which we are to presume was a document requiring Ashcroft's signature.

What's more, Comey testified that Ashcroft raised himself up from his hospital bed and read Gonzales and Card the riot act, ticking off all the reasons why he wasn't willing to reauthorize the warrantless surveillance. This was no friendly exchange. Comey said, "[Ashcroft] lifted his head off the pillow and in very strong terms expressed his view of the matter, rich in both substance and fact, which stunned me..."And then, in a line that would make a Hollywood action writer blush, Ashcroft declared, "But that doesn't matter, because I'm not the attorney general. There is the attorney general." He pointed to Comey. This is edge-of-your seat material.

What happened next? Comey said, "The two men [Gonzales and Card] did not acknowledge me. They turned and walked from the room."

Now, today, Gonzales insisted that he and Card hadn't come to pressure Ashcroft into signing anything. "Clearly if he had been competent and understood the facts and had been inclined to do so, yes we would have asked him," Gonzales added. "Andy Card and I didn't press him. We said 'Thank you' and we left."

Gonzales clarified this way: "We would not have sought nor did we intend to seek to get any approval from General Ashcroft if in fact he was not fully competent to make that decision." Key phrase: "if in fact he was not fully competent." Gonzales isn't denying that he and Card went to the hospital to get Ashcroft's approval. He's just saying that they didn't intend to seek it if he was not fully competent. At the very least, it seems that Gonzales and Card went to Ashcroft's bed side to see how sick he really was. There's no doubt about what they wanted, and according to Comey, they got it--the White House later reauthorized the program without the attorney general's signature. It took the threat of resignation--by Comey, Ashcroft, and FBI Director Robert Mueller--to compel President Bush to order his staff to bring the NSA program in line with Comey's and Ashcroft's concerns.

Labels: Justice Department, National Security Agency, NSA surveillance, Politics, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Tuesday, July 24, 2007

UPDATE: US could strike "actionable targets" in Pakistan

White House spokesman Tony Snow told reporters this morning that President Bush has not ruled out military action in Pakistan's tribal areas against Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Aboard Air Force One, Snow said, "We never rule out any options, including striking actionable targets." By actionable targets, Snow presumably means individuals or Al Qaeda holdouts that the United States knows about and can hit.

The full text of the exchange with a reporter follows:

Q Can I change the subject to Pakistan? Does the President have full confidence in Musharraf, particularly given the violence there from the Islamic --

MR. SNOW: Well, I think -- look, President Musharraf has put his life on the line and has been a very important ally in the war on terror. It's also clear that Taliban and al Qaeda, in the northwest territories and the federally administered tribal areas, have begun to put on operations that threaten the government of Pakistan itself, which is why President Musharraf, having tried one approach, in terms of dealing with the tribal leaders, is now going to have to be more aggressive and is being more aggressive moving forces into the region to deal with the security problems there.

Q Does the President rule out any U.S. military activity in Pakistan?

MR. SNOW: We never rule out any options, including striking actionable targets.

When asked, "Would the President seek Musharraf's permission to strike an actionable [target]?" Snow refused to say one way or the other. "Those are matters that are best not discussed publicly," he said.

This represents an increase in the U.S. pressure on Musharraf--which was already considerable--and effectively puts him on notice directly from the White House: If Musharraf can't handle the Al Qaeda problem, the United States will.

Labels: Pakistan, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Thursday, July 19, 2007

Message to Mush: We're coming.

Since the release of the new intelligence estimate on Al Qaeda Tuesday, the one that concluded the terrorist group has revitalized itself in the lawless hinterlands of Pakistan, intelligence analysts I talk to have been wondering why the administration chose to release the NIE now. Certainly the White House understood that its critics--and some of its supporters--would seize on the NIE's key judgement that Al Qaeda is stronger today and is poised to attack the United States as a repudiation of the president's war strategy, namely, that we should fight terrorists in Iraq so they don't attack us at home.

A nascent and evolving theory is that the administration is signaling now, to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and the world, that the United States is more prepared than it has been in years to send American forces into Pakistan's lawless tribal areas to do what Musharraf either cannot or will not--rout the resurgent Al Qaeda.

Consider some of the key plot points that have led to the current moment in the Pakistan narrative. In February, Defense Secretary Robert Gates made a surprise visit to Pakistan, ostensibly to ease the "war of words" between that country and Afghanistan over what to do with the troubled tribal areas. But Gates was also there to deliver a message to Musharraf--you need to do more to fix this problem.

About two weeks later, Vice President Dick Cheney flew to Islamabad to meet with Musharraf, taking with him the CIA's deputy director, Stephen Kappes, an seasoned spy and longtime Asia hand who had served in Pakistan. This was not a cordial call. Musharraf's intelligence services were, and still are, in shambles. Officials don't know who is loyal to Musharraf and who is loyal to jihadits in Pakistan, and this limits their effectiveness. Musharraf clearly lacks the human intelligence to get close to Al Qaeda without seeing his own troops slaughtered. So, one has to conclude that Kappes was there to provide the Pakistani president with more than moral support. The CIA is giving him intelligence, likely helping him understand who in his own country is trying to kill him, and to help Musharraf deal with the tribal areas. (Apparently this strategy hasn't been terribly effective, if the intelligence community's own judgment is that Al Qaeda is strong again.)

At the same time Cheney and Kappes were meeting with Musharraf, senior intelligence officials were briefing reporters on the growing threat of Al Qaeda in Pakistan, telling them that the organization had replenished its middle ranks. Intelligence indicated that the foiled British planes bombing plot the previous year had an operational link to the resurgent group, they said.

Fast forward to this month. The New York Times reported that, in 2005, the Pentagon called off a clandestine U.S. strike in the tribal areas aimed at capturing Al Qaeda officials. Then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld worried that the strike--which apparently had ballooned into a full-fledged invasion when military planners demanded security cover--would jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan relations. But in leaking this story two years later, the message to Musharraf from the Pentagon and the intelligence community was clear: We hesitated then, we won't now.

That brings us to this week's NIE, which put the official stamp on what we've known for months. A few days before its release, the intelligence community's top analyst publicly briefed members of Congress on the substance of the Pakistan problem.

Taken together, this build-up in U.S. anxiety--first expressed in surprise visits by top officials, now playing out in congressional testimony and public intelligence documents--signals that the Bush administration is dispensing with its light-touch strategy. It was that approach that kept thousands of combat troops from descending into the tribal areas in 2005. This has been replaced by tough public rhetoric and an undercurrent of hostility.

One has to wonder if the administration thinks the time for words has past. Is the United States moving towards its own military solution to Al Qaeda in Pakistan? The administration has stayed off that course for fear it would so badly destabilize Musharraf that he would lose his grip on power, with disastrous consequences for American interests. Well, the country appears to be sliding into instability, so perhaps one objection has gone away. But if Al Qaeda really has re-charged its batteries, and is more capable of striking out from Pakistan today than it has been in years--which is now the official line--then the administration might think it has no choice but to strike, if Musharraf won't.

It sounds implausible given the administration's cautious strategy to date. But consider what would happen if an Al Qaeda cell linked to Pakistan mounts a devastating attack in the United States. The United States would respond with full force, a la Afghanistan in 2002. Is the administration prepared to wait for that moment? I think that you can read between lines of the past several months and conclude, "Probably not."

Labels: CIA, Homeland Security, Pakistan, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Thursday, July 19, 2007

Homeland Security's rapid exodus

My colleague at Government Executive magazine, Katherine McIntire Peters, has a good story about the exodus of senior officials in the Homeland Security Department's upper ranks.

Senior Homeland Security Department employees left their jobs over the past two years at rates significantly higher than the average for other Cabinet-level departments, according to a report released Monday by the Government Accountability Office.

Attrition rates for Homeland Security's Senior Executive Service positions or those requiring presidential appointment were 14.5 percent in 2005 and 12.8 percent in 2006, the report (GAO-07-758) stated. That's more than twice the average attrition at all Cabinet-level departments of 7 percent and 6 percent during the same years.

Over the past several weeks, we've seen a procession of stories about leadership woes at DHS, which are intensified by the pending transition of power from the Bush administration to the next president, in January 2009. I wrote about this issue in National Journal last month. Then Congress and the Washington Post noted the preponderance of vacant posts in DHS' upper echelons.

Katherine's story on this latest GAO report sheds even more light on the problem. In the past two years, more than half of the senior employees at DHS headquarters in Washington "either resigned or transferred to another department," she reports. In light of employee satisfaction surveys that put DHS at or near the bottom in most categories, one can imagine that a good number of these employees left not just because they got new jobs, but because they wanted out of DHS. "Executives at headquarters, the Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Emergency Management Agency had the highest attrition rates," Katherine reports. Those three organizations, perhaps more than any others in the department, have suffered from low morale, bad publicity, and frequent turnover at the top.

Turnover was also higher than the government average among career, non-senior DHS employees--8.4 percent in 2005 and 7.1 percent in 2006. The overall average for federal agencies was 4 percent. Most of these numbers were accounted for by security screeners at airports, who make up more than one-third of the total DHS workforce. Factoring them out, DHS' numbers for non-senior employees' attrition fell below the federal average. Of course, the fact that there's so much turnover among the people charged with keeping terrorists and bombs off of airplanes might give overseers some pause.

Labels: Homeland Security, Management, Politics, Transition of Power

Shane Harris | Tuesday, July 17, 2007

Intelligence Estimate: No new news...but one intriguing message

There are no real surprises in the unclassified "key judgments" of a new National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism, out this morning. Most of the important assessments of the 16 intelligence agencies have already leaked out or were highlighted in other forums by senior officials in recent months.

We judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al-Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities.

Again, no surprises. The estimate does point out, echoing testimony by the country's top intelligence analyst last week, that Al Qaeda has "protected or regenerated key elements of hits Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)..."

In all, the one-and-a-half pages of unclassified nuggets aren't any more specific than what intelligence officials have put out for public consumption in the past year.

But there was one tantalizing bit at the end. The estimate seemed to say that the intelligence agencies need to better position themselves to counter the Internet as a tool for terrorism. In a section devoted to "technological advances" (read: the Internet, communications technologies, etc.) that continue to let "even small numbers of alienated people find and connect with one another, the authors drop this paragraph:

The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment
will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt
plots. It will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local
level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of
terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.

Let me read between the lines here a bit. "The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment..." Here, they're talking about picking up on the signals of an attack--online chatter, rhetoric on jihadi Web sites, but also message traffic, probably money transfers. We've known for a long time that the intelligence agencies focus on the Web and online transactions to detect terrorist patterns.

But to the second point, this "will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt plots;" that strikes me as a pretty candid admission. It's not like the intelligence agencies are saying, "We can't detect plotting on the Internet," but they're clearly pointing out this is an area of concern, and one that's going to keep putting counterterrorism specialists through their paces.

In light of this challenge, the agencies will need "greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information." This strikes me as a clear reference to the use of fusion centers, which are supposed to marry local intelligence with the global threat picture. This could be seen as a shot at the Homeland Security Department. Theoretically, it's DHS' job to put those two pieces together--local and global--but it has never really worked out that way. Most of this integration goes on at the National Counterterrorism Center, and the intelligence agencies hold sway there. The fusion centers themselves, while nominally under DHS' purview, are, in my experience, FBI-led affairs, with strong ties to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. It's not clear whether this part of the estimate could be read as a move to underscore that this intelligence fusion is really the intelligence community's job, or as a signal to DHS that they need to step into this role more forcefully. I have to conclude, though, based on my reporting, that it's the former. This is a clear signal that the intelligence community sees fusion centers, and in the integration of local, national, and global threat reporting, as a vital part of domestic security.

Finally, the estimate says the intelligence agencies must understand "how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions." That's the false-positive, false-negative challenge in a nut shell. How do you scan all this activity--whether online or in the physical world--and determine what is and isn't suspicious? This is an area of particular interest for me, and I've been writing about it for years. I think it's most interesting that, in an NIE devoted to terrorist threats to the Untied States, officials chose to point out this challenge. Clearly, it weighs heavily on their minds.

Labels: Director of National Intelligence, Fusion Centers, Homeland Security, Pakistan, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Tuesday, July 17, 2007

The Terrorism Enhancement: The story behind the story

I stumbled onto the terrorism enhancement story several months ago while reporting on another one: the National Security Agency's terrorist surveillance program. I learned about a trial of so-called "eco-terrorists" in Eugene, Oregon, part of the FBI's Operation Backfire against the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front. After lawyers for the defendants for Daniel McGowan, whom I write about in the lead of my story, and his fellow defendants learned that the NSA was monitoring terrorist communications inside the United States without warrants, their lawyers wanted to know if the government had intercepted any of their clients' information. Theoretically, if the government had used warranties wiretaps to secure their indictments--"fruit of the poisonous tree"--it could jeopardize the case. Prosecutors insisted they hadn't used warrantless surveillance information, and for a time it seemed that the government would have to prove that to the judge. Fast-forwarding a bit, the matter ultimately became moot when defendants struck a plea bargain.

It seemed like the NSA angle wouldn't pan out. But something else intrigued me. I learned that the prosecutors were pursuing a "terrorism enhancement" to the defendants' sentences. I've been covering counterterrorism for six years, but I had never heard of this law, which is contained in the same part of the the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that covers hate crimes and other "victim-related adjustments."

Why was the government pursuing a terrorism enhancement against environmental activists? And who else had they sought it against? That question led me into a months-long investigation that culminated in my current feature story.

Just figuring out how many times the government had sought the enhancement proved impossible--the U.S. Attorneys Office doesn't track that figure. But I was able to determine that judges have applied the enhancement at least 57 times in the past eight years. I studied more than half those cases--35--and learned that prosecutors sought the enhancement more often against domestic defendants, as opposed to members of international terrorist groups.

Labels: Homeland Security, Law, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Friday, July 13, 2007

Intelligence chief (finally) gets a deputy

For one year and 51 days, the nation's top intelligence official has been without a second-in-command. When Gen. Michael Hayden stepped down as the principal deputy director of national intelligence, in May of last year, to become the CIA director, it effectively left the intelligence community without a chief operating officer.

But today, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell announced that the president has nominated Donald M. Kerr to be McConnell's new No. 2. Kerr is currently director of the National Reconnaissance Office, a position he has held since July 2005. Previously, he was the CIA's top science and technology official, and he has served in a number of other posts.

The full text of McConnell's message to intelligence community employees announcing Kerr's nomination follows:

Dear Colleagues:

I am pleased to announce that the President today nominated Dr. Donald M. Kerr to be the next Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. He brings a wealth of experience and a focus on mission, gained from previous positions in the Intelligence Community, U.S. Government, and private industry.

Dr. Kerr currently serves as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office and the Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force (Intelligence Space Technology). He previously served as CIA Director of Science and Technology, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Laboratory Division), several positions at the Department of Energy, and as the Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory. I look forward to his strong support and insight as we move to complete my 500-Day Plan, and continue our vital work for the security of our nation.

In accordance with the Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Dr. Kerr's nomination is subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate. We look forward to their favorable consideration of his nomination.

Sincerely,

Mike McConnell

The search for a deputy DNI has been a long, sometimes tortured affair. Several officials were approached--they declined--and the White House shot down other selections. McConnell has been doing double-duty, acting as the president's chief intelligence adviser and trying to manage the community day-to-day.

After Hayden left for the CIA, intelligence observers worried that former DNI John Negroponte--who for all his diplomatic skills was never highly-regarded as an intelligence community manager--would be left in the lurch. Negroponte stayed on as DNI for seven more months, then left to become deputy secretary of state. When the president chose McConnell to replace him, intelligence observers breathed a sigh of releif--McConnell is deeply respected within the community, and career officials see him as "one of us."

But unlike Negroponte, McConnell was a management nut. He has embarked on an ambitious set of reform plans, including speeding up the security clearance process, devoting new resources to science and technology, and implementing joint-duty requirements for promotion to senior ranks. In short, McConnell is a born manager, which left many wondering what kind of skills he'd want in a deputy.

Just doing a quick reading of the tea leavs on Kerr's nomination, McConnell had to find someone willing to take on the arguably thankless job, as NPR's Mary Louise Kelly pointed out in a recent piece on Kerr's potential nomination. The Bush administration is also in its twilight. It's likely that McConnell prevailed upon Kerr's allegiance to the intelligence community--in which he has served for so many years--to come aboard and help him implement his reform plan.

I'm not sure whether some will see the move from NRO to the DNI's office as a promotion--probably not--but it does give Kerr an ostensibly wider purview of the nation's spy agencies, and that may have been attractive to him. He must figure that he has something to contribute.

One other note: The DNI's office is launching a big push on the science and technology front. As part of the fiscal 2008 budget request, McConnell has asked Congress for money to set up the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, iARPA, modeled after the successful Pentagon R&D unit, DARPA. Kerr used to run the CIA's science and technology division, and so has some familiarity with that terrain. As a former senior CIA official reminded me this morning, a huge portion of the intelligence community is devoted to technical issues--everything from signals collection and processing to geospatial intelligence. Kerr is also double-hatted at NRO--he's assistant to the Secretary of the Airforce. He has defense credentials, and likely got the blessing of Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

Kerr might be able to provide some bureaucratic cover for McConnell, too. In a controversial move, iARPA would take away the money that the CIA and other agencies receive for community-wide intelligence projects. (The agencies get to keep science and technology funds slated for their own, individual purposes.) Kerr will likely understand the sensitivities involved in dipping into other agencies' rice bowls, and so he might be able to help shepherd that process as the deputy DNI.

(For the record, here's the White House's personnel announcement on Kerr.)

Labels: Director of National Intelligence, Management

Shane Harris | Thursday, July 12, 2007

Top intel analyst: Pakistan new home base for Al Qaeda

Tom Fingar, the deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, is delivering a "global security assessment" to the House Armed Services Committee today. In his prepared remarks, just released, Fingar singles out Pakistan as the current home base for Al Qaeda, which he calls “the terrorist organization that poses the greatest threats to U.S. interests, including to the homeland.”

We have captured or killed numerous senior al-Qa’ida operatives, but we also have seen that al-Qa’ida’s core elements are resilient. They continue to plot attacks against our Homeland and other targets with the objective of inflicting mass casualties. They continue to maintain active connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders hiding in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North and East Africa, and Europe.

Fingar’s remarks echo the assessment senior intelligence officials have put out—on background with journalists—in the past few months: Al Qaeda has re-grouped, with a new cadre of middle and senior management, in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The foiled plot to blow up multiple passenger jets flying from the U.K. to the U.S. last year was linked back to Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, intelligence officials have said.

The political ramifications of a resurgent Al Qaeda in Pakistan are huge for the Bush administration. One need only imagine the political price the president would have paid had Al Qaeda succeeded in its attempts to kill thousands of airline passengers , and if the brain trust for that plot were found to have been hiding out in Pakistan, with the full knowledge of the White House and our intelligence service. The planes bombing plot was designed to rival, if not exceed, the 9/11 attacks, at least in terms of human casualties.

In his prepared remarks, Fingar added, rather ominously, that “Pakistan, despite its ongoing efforts [to crack down in Islamic militants], continues to face terrorism’s many challenges, while that country also raises other concerns for us.” He also said Pakistan can expect harder times to come:

With tribal opposition to the US military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq widespread and elections expected later this year, the situation will become even more challenging—for President Musharraf and for the US.

• Moreover, democracy has not been fully restored since the Army took power in 1999 and Musharraf’s suspension of Pakistan’s Chief Justice in March has brought thousands of protesters into the streets and increased public demand for a fully democratic system.

It’s important to remember that, last February, Vice President Cheney made an unannounced visit to Islamabad to show the United States’ displeasure with Musharraf’s apparently deficient efforts to squelch the Al Qaeda resurgence. Who did Cheney take with him? The CIA’s No. 2, Steve Kappes, a beloved career operations officer who has worked in Pakistan and knows the Middle East intimately. Undoubtedly, along with the United States’ insistence that Pakistan do more was an offer to help them do just that, through increased participation with our clandestine service.

Labels: CIA, Pakistan, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Wednesday, July 11, 2007

DHS "well on our way" to preparing for transition

In a discussion about surveillance cameras in New York City this morning, Diane Rehm devoted some air time to turnover and vacancies in the senior ranks of the Homeland Security Department. (See yesterday’s post.) DHS Spokesman Russ Knocke joined by phone, and said that, in April, the department was permitted to hire an additional 73 senior level positions. Officials are trying to “cross-train” them with existing employees, so that they’re ready to take over in January 2009, when a new administration comes in, he said. “We need high-caliber leaders in these spots, and we believe we’re well on our way to getting there."

When I interviewed DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson back in May, he gave some more specifics. He acknowledged that it hadn’t been easy to keep good help. "We've had a significant turnover," he said. "And that turnover has been below the top-level jobs as well." (A number of those positions remain vacant, according to a new House Homeland Security Committee report.) But, Jackson said, preparations for the transition are well under way. "I would say we are well beyond the halfway point in what we have to get done."

Also on the show today, former DHS Inspector General Clark Kent Ervin said he was distressed by the high turnover and vacancies. “I think it’s troubling, really, that there are so many high-level positions at [DHS] that are open,” he said. Ervin also noted that, compared to other departments, the vacancies are “unusually high” at DHS. Why? Ervin cited a confluence of factors. “The department has the lowest morale” of any in government. It has “been underfunded since the beginning.” (Ervin noted that he’s a conservative Republican “who typically does not call for greater government spending.”) And Ervin pointed out that, in the wake of high-profile disasters like Hurricane Katrina, it hasn’t been easy to attract and retain a lot of talent at DHS. It won’t be any easier given that the Bush administration’s final days in office are upon us, he added.

Of the recent terrorist plot in London, Ervin emphasized that it was no coincidence the strikes came during a governmental transition, from former Prime Minister Tony Blair to new PM Gordon Brown. He also reminded listeners that terrorists blew up commuter trains in Madrid three days before the national elections in 2004. (I discussed this significance of this pattern, and what it means for DHS, in my story on the upcoming transition.

Knocke said DHS officials “are mindful of recent events in London,” and “the timeliness of attacks [in Madrid].” That echoed Jackson’s sentiments. The deputy secretary told me that the possibility of a terrorist attack timed to the U.S. transition in 2009 factors into officials planning now.

Labels: Homeland Security, Management, Transition of Power

Shane Harris | Tuesday, July 10, 2007

Trouble in DHS' Upper Ranks

A congressional report out this morning leads off with a story I wrote about the Homeland Security Department's reliance on politically appointed leaders.

Spencer Hsu has a good piece in this morning's Washington Post about that report and the administration's failure to fill about a quarter of the top leadership posts at DHS, "creating a 'gaping hole' in the nation's preparedness for a terrorist attack or other threat, according to a congressional report to be released today." Spencer references my previous story, as well.

"The DHS has one of the largest rosters of senior political appointees in the federal government, in part because of how it was created. The DHS says it has never had more than 220 senior political appointees, although the Office of Personnel Management told Congress of more than 360 in 2004, National Journal reported last month."

The Wall Street Journal's Informed Reader picked up on my story, too, last month. You can also listen to an interview I did with Federal News radio about DHS' political appointees.

Labels: Homeland Security, Management, Media Notes and Appearances, Politics

Shane Harris | Monday, July 09, 2007