China's Cyber Militia

Just a quick heads up to those who might not be on my e-mail list, a pointer to a cover story in Friday's National Journal on China's cyber militia. U.S. intelligence officials and computer security experts believe that Chinese hackers may be responsible for two major blackouts, as well as the theft of information from Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez. The Associated Press picked up on the Gutierrez incident today, as well.

Labels: CIA, Cyber Cold War, Director of National Intelligence, Homeland Security, National Security Agency

Shane Harris | Thursday, May 29, 2008

Interview: John Brennan

This week, I sat down with John Brennan, the current chairman of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance. Brennan, who was the first director of the National Counterterrorism Center, is now advising Sen. Barack Obama on intelligence and foreign policy. Brennan is also the president and chief executive officer of The Analysis Corporation, headquartered in McLean, Va., which does a great deal of work for the intelligence community.

In our interview, Brennan discussed restructuring the intelligence community, renewing FISA and debating counterterrorism on the campaign trail. Edited excerpts follow. You can also access the transcript at National Journal's Web site.

Q: Are we hearing a sufficient level of debate and distinction among the candidates of their various national security and counterterrorism positions?

Brennan: I think we are hearing some of that debate. And that debate is going to intensify as we get closer to the election.

There has been a fair amount of discussion, particularly on the terrorism front, about the different types of approaches. But I think it's mainly at the strategic level.

The intelligence business is a very complicated one, and I think a lot of the nuances may be lost on people. It's difficult in a presidential debate to really get into those intricacies.

I think there's a real issue related to some of the approaches that the next administration will have toward some of those countries, in particular, that still pose national security challenges to us -- for example, Iran, and whether or not there needs to be some initiative on the part of the United States to see whether there's some way to bridge the gap, or whether we should maintain a confrontational posture toward Iran.

Senator Obama and Senator [Hillary Rodham] Clinton have expressed an interest in trying to reach out, even to our adversaries. There are differences between those two as to when the president should get engaged.

Q: As a counterterrorism professional, is there one path that you see as more productive?

Brennan: I think that what we need in our quiver are many different types of arrows. We certainly need to have a military arrow. We need to have an intelligence one. But we need to have a diplomatic one. We need to have foreign aid. There needs to be a comprehensive set of approaches. A lot of these issues, including counterterrorism, cannot be solved with kinetic force.

I am a strong proponent of trying to focus more of our efforts on the upstream phenomenon of terrorism. I make the analogy to pollution. We learned that pollutants kill us when they get into the water we drink or the fish we eat or the air we breathe. But I think we also learned that we have to go upstream to identify and eliminate those sources of pollution. Terrorism is a tactic, and we have to be more focused upstream. Since 9/11, understandably we've focused downstream, on those terrorists who might be in our midst or trying to kill us, the operators. I think there needs to be much more attention paid to those upstream factors and conditions that spawn terrorists.

We also have to have a full discussion about the appropriate techniques we're going to use when individuals are captured or detained. But we have to be looking at what are those foreign policies, aid programs, international efforts that we need to be engaged in, that are going to try and stem the flow of those terrorists further upstream. I think a lot of our resources have been dedicated to that downstream phenomenon; I think the United States is a lot safer because we put in place the security filters to prevent terrorists from coming into our country. Now we have to look at the longer-term issues that are more difficult to deal with -- why individuals are succumbing to a lot of the recruitment efforts on the part of terrorist groups.

Q: What is the appropriate government agency to handle that?

Brennan: This is an issue the government is grappling with. A lot of the issues right now fall between the Department of State and the Department of Defense and Commerce and others. I think as we deal with these transnational issues, we need to bring to bear those capabilities that exist in different agencies. The National Counterterrorism Center is a place that is trying to deal with the issue in a comprehensive fashion. They have a group there, the Strategic Operational Planning Group, which is trying to bring to bear the full instruments of U.S. national power, from the diplomatic front to the intelligence front to law enforcement and defense. I think we need to have more of these integrated efforts, because no single department can in fact address the issues.

Q: People like you have talked about the need to do this for some time. Why haven't we seen this take hold as an ethos in government?

Brennan: There are a number of factors. One is, it's really, really hard. It addresses legacy institutions and architectures and ways of doing business. In Washington, it's difficult to rearrange how you do work. It would be overhauling, in many respects, the way we do government work. That requires legislation, a close interaction and coordination between the executive and legislative branches, and it also affects a lot of rice bowls.

Q: Then what will it take to finally push this through and make agencies feel compelled to change?

Brennan: It certainly isn't something that should be done quickly or without appropriate thought. I'm an advocate of having a review of the U.S. governance structures that's going to transcend administrations. It's going to be something that people are going to get together and say, "What type of governance structures and changes need to take place so that we can deal with the challenges of 2015, 2020?" The Department of Defense went though the Goldwater-Nichols Act [which changed the military command structure], but I would argue reorganizing a department is easier than reorganizing how many agencies are going to interoperate. I think we still are struggling with that.

Q: Would it make sense then to make the Director of National Intelligence more like the FBI director, someone who's not necessarily going to leave when the administration changes?

Brennan: I'm an advocate of having term appointments for the Director of National Intelligence. I think it makes sense. But the intelligence community is a subset of the broader national security establishment, which is a subset of the broader U.S. government. I would argue that the challenge for the next decade is how you're going to ensure better interaction between the federal, state, and local elements, in terms of information sharing, knowledge, and expertise.

Q: In your estimation, where is the threat level of terrorism today versus where it was right after 9/11? How big is the threat domestically? How has it changed?

Brennan: There are two sides to that coin. Whenever you do a net assessment, you look at the threat and the vulnerability. Let me take the vulnerability side. A lot has happened in the past six years in terms of making the homeland a much less hospitable environment for terrorists to ply their trade. We should feel good that our borders are not as porous. There's a much more substantial watch-listing effort. And a much better capability to detect terrorists and terrorist activity within our borders.

That said, on the threat side, while Al Qaeda, the organization, has been badly bloodied since 9/11, they still retain a potentially lethal capability. There has been a metastasis. Al Qaeda has manifested itself in a lot of different countries and communities, and it's a movement that continues to be grown and fueled by a number of factors.

One, is, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we no longer have this bipolar world where you had the United States and the Soviet Union competing with each other and proxies lining up behind them. We now have basically a unilateral world with the United States as the sole superpower from a military and economic standpoint. But also, we've seen the fading away of a lot of competing ideologies: socialism, Baathism, Nasserism, communism and others. They have been discredited. You have in some respects Western capitalism on one side, and on the other side, maybe those religiously-driven forms of extremism. Islamic extremism has filled the void where in the past there were alternatives in terms of competing ideologies. We don't have the same number of "-isms" out there. And so I think this [Islamic extremism] is going to continue to garner support and recruits in different parts of the world.

Q: Compare our ability to counter ideologies versus our tactical capabilities to collect more intelligence, to share it, to do more sophisticated things with it.

Brennan: I think unfortunately we have been way behind the curve as far as the public relations campaign -- making sure the image of the United States is seen in a more positive light. When I first went to the Middle East, I studied in Cairo in 1975, and the U.S. was viewed as the sponsor and supporter of Israel. But when I was in Egypt, I was regularly befriended by people, because Americans were still looked upon in a very positive way. Unfortunately, the U.S. image now is not the same as it was several decades ago. The Iraq situation, unfortunately, was viewed as military adventurism on the part of the United States. We need to repair that image. We need to make sure we convey to the world the types of things the United States is committed to. That is very difficult. Focusing on the downstream effort is, in some respects, easier because it's more tangible. You can go after those high-value targets; you can go after those training camps.

Q: In the 2004 campaign, it seemed you had on one hand President Bush talking about downstream efforts, and then John Kerry articulating something more like the public diplomacy approach. It became a partisan division: that if you were for public diplomacy, you were weaker and identified with Democrats, and if you were on the Republican side, then you were with the president and fighting the fight. It seems not that pronounced this time, and that the candidates are talking more about combating ideologies. Is there still a divide between hard war and soft war?

Brennan: I think there is a divide. Obama is a good example in terms of the different approaches between the parties. In the articulation of the public effort, there needs to be the companion discussion about the need to act forcefully to ensure that U.S. lives and property are protected. I think some of the statement you see coming out from the Democratic side is to reassure the American public that although public diplomacy is going to be a major part of that foreign policy approach, it's not going to be at the expense of ensuring that we're going to be able to utilize military and other measures to take action against the threats.

Q: Assess the debate in Congress and with the administration over reforming the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. [Democratic lawmakers allowed the temporary extension of that law, the Protect America Act, to expire, over the vehement objections of the White House.] Why has it come to this point where politics has arguably pulled things off the rails?

Brennan: There is this great debate over whether or not the telecom companies should in fact be given immunity for their agreement to provide support and cooperate with the government after 9/11. I do believe strongly that they should be granted that immunity, because they were told to do so by the appropriate authorities that were operating in a legal context, and so I think that's important. And I know people are concerned about that, but I do believe that's the right thing to do. I do believe the Senate version of the FISA bill addresses the issues appropriately. [Director of National Intelligence] Mike McConnell, I think, did a very good job trying to articulate the distinctions between the old FISA law, the FISA understanding under the Protect America Act, and then the House and Senate versions.

There are many types of scenarios for signals [for example, telephone calls and e-mails] to be accessed. But whenever this happens, there needs to be some substantive predicate, a probable cause, that someone is being targeted appropriately. There is an important issue about timeliness. And even though you can go through the FISA process, particularly when you're dealing with terrorism issues, there needs to be an understanding that intelligence agencies can move quickly if certain predicates are met. We shouldn't be held hostage to a complicated, globalized [information technology] structure that puts up obstacles to that timely collection. I think there are some very, very sensible people on both sides of the partisan divide trying to make this happen. And it's unfortunate that it's become embroiled now in a partisan debate in some quarters. But I think that's expected in any election year, especially one like this.

Q: So how do we get to the point where the public has reasonable assurances that what an intelligence agency does to determine probable cause, or that predicate, is based on sound technique?

Brennan: Maybe there needs to be a system of executive, legislative and judicial representatives who are going to oversee and ensure that this moves along the right path. It really takes those three legs of government to make sure there aren't advertent or inadvertent abuses.

You can have FISA judges and representatives from Congress, not to routinely review those individual requests [for surveillance], but the process, the criteria, and to make sure it's being followed in a strict fashion.

Q: You know that one big debate about FISA is the question of balancing security and privacy and civil liberties. Speaking as someone who has spent your life in counterterrorism, what do the terms "privacy" and "civil liberties" mean to you, and what is that balance?

Brennan: First of all, privacy and civil liberties mean so many different things to different people. There are people on one end of the spectrum that don't want to have any government interference or insight into what you're doing.

To me, I think the government does have the right and the obligation to ensure the security and safety of its citizens. If there is probable cause, reasonable suspicion, about the involvement of a U.S. person in something, the government needs to have the ability to understand what the nature of that involvement is. The threshold for that type of government access can be high or can be low, and it needs to be somewhere in the middle.

It really gets back to that issue of what is the substantive predicate. ... If we know there's a terrorist overseas that has been involved in activities, but he's also an import-export dealer, and he reaches out to Shane Harris because you happen to be an importer of stuff -- you're a U.S. citizen -- and we can see there's contact going on there, well, is that sufficient to give us reasonable suspicion that Shane Harris is involved in something? And Shane Harris happens to be in touch with somebody in his neighborhood that has a past record in engagement in some type of things. So there is going to be a judgment call here.

And what I think is important is that there needs to be an airing of this issue, public hearings that Congress can hold. You can't explain the issue in such rich detail that you can say exactly where that line is going to be drawn. But there needs to be an articulation of those triggers that the American people overall feel, yes, that's the right thing for the government to do.

You don't want to just troll and with a large net just pull up everything. There are technologies available to pulse the data set and pull back only that which has some type of correlation to your predicate.

Q: Is this the difference between the government controlling information, locking it down, and having controlled access to certain data sets which do exist?

Brennan: Right. And I would argue for the latter. Private sector companies can do things the government is unable to do, for marketing to their clients. I would argue the government needs to have access to only those nuggets of information that have some kind of predicate. That way the government can touch it and pull back only that which is related. It's like a magnet, set to a certain calibration. That's what I think we need to go to.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the threshold, quite frankly, was low, because we didn't know the nature of the threat we faced here in the U.S. Every effort was made by the government to try to get as much understanding and visibility into what else might be out there that's going to hurt us again. Now that a number of years have passed, we need to make sure the calibration is important. But maybe in a period of heightened threat you have to recalibrate that based on new information you have -- new intelligence that's going to give you a better sense of where to aim your magnet.

These are things that need to be discussed openly -- not to the point of revealing sources and methods and giving the potential terrorists out there insight into our capability -- but to make sure there is a general understanding and consensus that these initiatives, collections, capabilities, and techniques comport with American values and are appropriately adjusted to deal with the threat we face.

Q: How does the next president go about doing that?

Brennan: It's going to be a real tough job. Even though people may criticize what has happened during the two Bush administrations, there has been a fair amount of continuity. A new administration, be it Republican or Democrat -- you're going to have a fairly significant change of people involved at the senior-most levels. And I would argue for continuity in those early stages.

You don't want to whipsaw the [intelligence] community. You don't want to presume knowledge about how things fit together and why things are being done the way they are being done. And you have to understand the implication, then, of making any major changes or redirecting things. I'm hoping there will be a number of professionals coming in who have an understanding of the evolution of the capabilities in the community over the past six years, because there is a method to how things have changed and adapted. My advice, to whoever is coming in, is they need to spend some time learning, understanding what's out there, inventorying those things, and identifying those key issues or priorities that they have -- FISA or something else. They need to make sure they do their homework, and it's not just going to be knee-jerk responses.

Q: In other words, don't come in and do a housecleaning?

Brennan: Right -- not just in terms of people, but also programs. You don't want to create upheaval, because it will create a disruption in the system. There are still a lot people who say we have to implement all of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. I have problems with some of those, because they're not really anchored in reality. Sometimes a superficial understanding of a problem leads one to making superficial decisions.

Q: It seems unlikely that any of the leading candidates would come in and dismantle things. They're fairly savvy to the kinds of things you're talking about. Is that the case, or is there still a risk there will be a political calculation, in that the next president will need to make a demonstrable effort to wipe the slate?

Brennan: I don't think anybody's going to come in and just make wholesale changes. But there's going to be a learning curve... at a time when you're still faced with national security challenges. So they have to be learning as they go, but at the same time managing all these issues and making sure they don't drop any balls at all. It's going to be challenging, and I wouldn't be surprised if some of America's enemies didn't see if they could take advantage of that transition, and to see whether or not they can do things that are going to be confrontational and provocative to test the new administration.

Published in National Journal.

Labels: CIA, Director of National Intelligence, FISA, Homeland Security, Interviews, Management, NSA surveillance, Politics, Terrorism, Transition of Power

Shane Harris | Friday, March 07, 2008

RNC goes Daisy

The Republican National Committee has a new ad warning that Harry Reid, Hillary Clinton, and Barack Obama are playing into terrorists' hands by trying to block permanent changes to surveillance law. Not that Republicans haven't been playing tough over this issue. They’ve also tried to assert that if the Protect America Act is allowed to expire, all intelligence-gathering will come to a halt. That's not true, although it could be harder to monitor new targets.

But what's noteworthy about this RNC ad is that we've seen it before, in the Johnson-Goldwater campaign from 1964. The famous (or infamous, if you supported Goldwater) “Daisy” spot was only aired once, but may have so successfully stoked Americans’ fears about nuclear annihilation that it helped LBJ win the election. The RNC ad all but says Americans will be killed by Al Qaeda if Clinton or Obama win the presidency. Expect to see the full-fledged Daisy version as we get closer to November.

Putting that aside for the moment, what's perhaps most politically notable about the GOP-Dem fight over the Protect America Act is that the Democrats have been unable to capitalize on their position for their own gain. They don’t really want to bankrupt telecommunications companies who helped the NSA monitor phone calls and e-mails after 9/11, even though they did so without traditional warrants. And neither Democrats nor Republicans believe that the law shouldn't be changed to make it easier for intelligence agencies to do their job. The politics of this debate have become so basic that there's little room left for serious debate or discussion of broader implications from a change to law, and whether those should be taken into consideration.

I think that if you assess this fight purely on the politics, Democrats are once again coming out on the losing end. They seem either unwilling or unable to assert an alternative to the kind of line the RNC is putting out in its video, which may have some fair points but obviously is not designed to encourage an intellectual discussion. This is all very strange, because Democrats have proposed dramatic changes to surveillance law that their traditional allies in the civil liberties community find repugnant. It's not as if Dems are truly obstructionist on this stuff. But they are letting themselves be painted as such.

Labels: FISA, Homeland Security, NSA surveillance, Politics, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Friday, February 08, 2008

"Part-time help" at DHS is leaving

The No. 2 official at the Homeland Security Department, Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, is leaving his post for financial reasons, he announced in an e-mail to colleagues today. Jackson has been at DHS since March 2005. He said he'll leave next month.

I interviewed Jackson in May about his efforts to prepare DHS for the upcoming presidential transition. The department has been plagued by turnover at the senior most levels, a fact that Jackson acknowledged, and experts worry that this makes the department especially vulnerable in the normally rocky hand-off from one administration to another.

"We've had a significant turnover," Jackson said. "And that turnover has been below the top-level jobs as well."

Some of Jackson's other quotes about DHS' personnel issues seem rather ironic now, in light of his decision to leave.

• "We're trying to nurture a cadre of owners. I am the part-time help at DHS."
• "I won't blow smoke at you and say everything is nailed down and perfectly fixed. The day that someone in my department tells you that about DHS is the day that person should get out of his job."
• "If a day goes by and I don't use up some of my brain cells focusing on this [transition] problem, it's a very unusual day."

Jackson insisted that the transition was "not something I feel anxiety about." But employees and DHS watchers are likely to feel a mix of anxiety and maybe some relief with this changing of the guard. On the one-hand, Jackson was managing the sprawling department day-to-day, along with an army of lieutenants. His exit leaves an important vacancy at the very top, which officials will, presumably, scramble to fill.

But others might welcome the change. Some of Jackson's critics have accused him of micro-managing decisions, and not yielding enough authority to his subordinates. Those critics say that DHS could operate more efficiently with a lighter touch.

Regardless of how Jackson's departure is greeted, though, one thing is sure: This puts DHS in a precarious position. The department desperately needs strong leadership, and its hierarchical structure necessitates that it come from the top. The new deputy may change that, but for now, it's the way things are.

As an aside, political strategists will likely see no coincidence between the timing of Jackson's departure and the nomination of Michael Mukasey to be attorney general. When Alberto Gonzales announced his intention to resign, the early betting was on DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff to replace him. Presumably, had Chertoff become AG, Jackson would have moved up to secretary at DHS. I don't know what financial concerns were behind Jackson's decision to depart, but many will presume that when it was clear he wasn't being promoted, that fact figured into his calculus.

For his part, Chertoff had this to say about his departing colleague in a press release.

Michael will leave this department having made an enduring impact on our homeland security. At this department, he was fundamental in invigorating our operating components, fusing our intelligence capabilities, building a new FEMA, and managing the response to the disrupted airline plot of August 2006. He brought tremendous focus, discipline and planning to department-wide operations, budgets and polices, and he significantly advanced the integration of our component agencies. Michael kept an open door for all 208,000 employees, and was relentless in building with them a common department culture. His work has earned him wide respect throughout the Congress, with state and local officials and among international allies.

Our homeland is more secure and better prepared as result of Michael’s tireless service, and on behalf of all Americans, I offer him our deep gratitude. I respect and admire his difficult decision to move on, and I look forward to our continued friendship.

Labels: Homeland Security, Management, Politics, Transition of Power

Shane Harris | Monday, September 24, 2007

The American Forum: The Freedom of Press in a Post 9-11 Era

On the eve of the seventh anniversary of 9/11, I was privileged to join a panel of journalists and national security experts to discuss freedom of the press. The event was held at American University and broadcast on Washington's local NPR station, WAMU.

Labels: Homeland Security, Media Notes and Appearances, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Monday, September 10, 2007

Why Michael Chertoff is a radioactive pick for AG

Just when you thought it was safe to come back from vacation...

At the same moment we learned Alberto Gonzales would step down as attorney general, that favorite Washington parlor game, "Replacement Pick," kicked into high gear. Initial speculation focused on Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, a former prosecutor, federal judge, and senior Justice Department official, who, some have long thought, has had his eye on an an eventual AG nod or a Supreme Court nomination in exchange for his DHS service.

But the odds now seem against Chertoff. The chatter I'm picking up has him as a long-shot pick. One concern is that moving any cabinet secretary into the AG slot would mean two confirmation hearings, at a time when the administration would prefer to keep its chieftains out of Congress' crosshairs.

I see three big reasons why Chertoff is a radioactive pick as AG. Any one of these might not kill his chances, but cumulatively, I think they add up to a no-go.

1.) Katrina. Today is the second anniversary of the storm's devastation of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. Chertoff had been on the job six months at the time, and his department's response, like the hurricane itself, was a disaster. The Gulf still reels from the storms' effects. (The Times Picayune had this message, blasted across its front page, for President Bush, who's visiting the region today.) Some think Chertoff escaped much of the blame for the response, and even though his duties as attorney general would have nothing to do with storm recovery, confirmation hearings would force him to answer questions about his actions two years ago.

2.) Torture Memo and Guantanamo Detainees. It's worth revisiting Chertoff's confirmation hearings, at which he faced intense questioning about his role in crafting a memo on detainee treatment. The questions held up the hearings for a time. Mark Benjamin digs deep on this in a piece for Salon, in which he pointedly asks, "Did Chertoff lie to Congress about Guantanamo?"

3.) Politicization and mismanagement at DHS. The new attorney general is supposed to restore credibility and career morale at the Justice Department. Given Chertoff's mixed track record on both fronts at Homeland Security, it's questionable whether lawmakers would see him as the right man for that job. The department is in the midst of a transition from mostly political leadership to career managers. Under Chertoff, the trend towards political management--and politicization--was palpable. The House Homeland Security Committee has cited "critical leadership vacancies" at the department; a quarter of top positions remain unfilled. As I wrote in June, DHS has a reputation as a land of misfit toys, a place where Bush loyalists and partisans get patronage posts for which they lack qualifications. Despite Chertoff's efforts now to turn that tide, the reputation has stuck, and one can imagine how lawmakers would judge skeptically his ability to cleanse Justice of the stain of partisanship.

So, who are the leading contenders to replace Gonzales? The field appears wide open at the moment, which is a good indication that the White House is slowly and deliberately reaching out to several candidates, either to feel out their interest or to begin wearing them down so they'll eventually agree to take the job.

For my part, I'm putting early money on a dark horse candidate, who, a colleague perceptively noted, is a protege of White House counsel Fred Fielding, the man heading up the AG search. I'm going with former federal judge Michael Luttig, now general counsel at Boeing. The only hole missing in this man's impeccable resume is a stint as attorney general. Luttig had a dust-up, of sorts, with the administration over the Jose Padilla case. (He had ruled the administration could hold Padilla, a US citizen, as an enemy combatant, and later refused the government's request to transfer him to criminal court.) But I'm not convinced that rules him out as a pick. (It will certainly provide fuel for the president's critics, however.) Still, Fielding is known to consider Luttig one of his proudest accomplishments. See Luttig's resignation letter, in which he thanks Bush's father for making his dreams come true, and sums up his view of the judiciary's role in the war on terror. Fielding, you should remember, also groomed another bright jurist by the name of John Roberts.

Scenario 2: In a replay of the 2000 Cheney-led search for a vice president, Fielding himself is put up for the job. Bush has a rough track record with White House counsels turned-AG (read, ahem, Al Gonzales), and Harriet Miers didn't fare so well in her attempted jump to greener pastures. But Fielding is respected by Republicans and Democrats, and by several accounts, despite his role in stalling the White House's response to congressional subpoenas on US Attorneys and warrantless wiretapping, is reportedly well-liked by both sides.

Labels: Homeland Security, Justice Department, Politics, Transition of Power

Shane Harris | Wednesday, August 29, 2007

Senators ask for full report on runaway TB patient

Sens. Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.), Susan Collins (R-Maine), and Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) have asked the Government Accountability Office for a detailed report on the case of Andrew Speaker, the Georgia man who was able to slip back into the United States, through Canada, even though federal health and security officials thought he was infected with an extremely drug-resistant strain of tuberculosis.

Lieberman, who chairs the Senate committee overseeing the Homeland Security Department, and his colleagues sent a letter yesterday to GAO chief David Walker, asking for a "thorough chronological account of the significant events and communications that occurred..." The incident "raises questions not only about events that transpired...but in the federal government’s overall approach to safeguarding our nation from public health threats before they reach our borders," the Senators wrote.

Speaker's case also raised serious questions about how the federal government has adapted to the specific nature of terrorists threats--namely, that terrorists do not behave rationally and frequently engage in unpredictable behavior. Speaker was no terrorist--and as it turns out, he had a less-serious form of TB than previously thought--but many of his evasive actions, to include entering the United States through Canada in an apparent attempt to avoid detection by U.S. authorities, shed a light on the government's terrorism responses. At many points in the tale, officials seemed to think that Speaker would behave rationally and not try to slip past them.

The full text of the senators letter follows:

July 24, 2007

The Honorable David Walker, Comptroller General
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Walker,

The recent case involving Andrew Speaker’s putative extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) has exposed a disturbing picture of the federal government’s ability to respond to a known public health incident and protect our homeland security. Thankfully it appears unlikely that this incident has resulted in the infection of more individuals with TB, but we must determine exactly what went wrong and do all that we can to ensure this does not happen again. The miscommunication, insufficient coordination and the ultimate response on the part of the agencies involved are troubling.

We, like many others, are concerned by the public health threat posed by both XDR-TB and multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), and we believe the events of the past few weeks highlight the lack of preparedness on the part of our government in responding to a public health incident. Although both XDR-TB and MDR-TB make up less than 2% of the over 13,000 cases of tuberculosis reported in the United States on an annual basis, they present a grave public health threat. In addition to the individual threat that is posed by drug-resistant TB, this incident goes to the heart of our nation’s response to serious public health threats.

Mr. Speaker’s ability to cross our borders raises questions not only about events that transpired at that inland port but in the federal government’s overall approach to safeguarding our nation from public health threats before they reach our borders.

We should never again have a situation where delays and failures in communication between the federal government, other domestic public health officials and relevant commercial entities lead to needless exposure and risk. We need to assure the American people that our government can respond in a coordinated manner to these types of public health incidents. This incident should serve as a wake-up call that we need to establish and exercise effective plans to deal with the travel of known public health threats.

To help us better understand this incident, we would like GAO to (1) review and describe the sequence of events, establishing a thorough chronological account of the significant events and communications that occurred, and (2) assess the sequence to answer the following questions:

* To what extent did responsible federal agencies and other key organizations--including CDC, DHS, DOT, and relevant state and local health departments, international health organizations, foreign governments, and airlines--have plans, protocols, agreements, and processes in place to provide for effective coordination and information sharing and for prompt notification and response to the incident?
* To what extent were these followed?
* What information systems, databases, and networks were used in responding to this incident? To what extent did they provide needed information in a timely manner?
* What lessons learned did the incident reveal about the systems, processes, and protocols used to respond and how are agencies integrating these lessons learned to prevent future such incidents? What quarantine protocols or procedures are applicable to similar incidents? How are agencies safeguarding civil liberties when implementing changes?

As you proceed with this study, we ask that GAO apprise us of any external impairment that could potentially delay its completion in a timely manner. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact us or our staff.

Sincerely,

Joseph I. Lieberman
United States Senator

Susan M. Collins
United States Senator

Hillary Rodham Clinton
United States Senator

Labels: Homeland Security, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Wednesday, July 25, 2007

Message to Mush: We're coming.

Since the release of the new intelligence estimate on Al Qaeda Tuesday, the one that concluded the terrorist group has revitalized itself in the lawless hinterlands of Pakistan, intelligence analysts I talk to have been wondering why the administration chose to release the NIE now. Certainly the White House understood that its critics--and some of its supporters--would seize on the NIE's key judgement that Al Qaeda is stronger today and is poised to attack the United States as a repudiation of the president's war strategy, namely, that we should fight terrorists in Iraq so they don't attack us at home.

A nascent and evolving theory is that the administration is signaling now, to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and the world, that the United States is more prepared than it has been in years to send American forces into Pakistan's lawless tribal areas to do what Musharraf either cannot or will not--rout the resurgent Al Qaeda.

Consider some of the key plot points that have led to the current moment in the Pakistan narrative. In February, Defense Secretary Robert Gates made a surprise visit to Pakistan, ostensibly to ease the "war of words" between that country and Afghanistan over what to do with the troubled tribal areas. But Gates was also there to deliver a message to Musharraf--you need to do more to fix this problem.

About two weeks later, Vice President Dick Cheney flew to Islamabad to meet with Musharraf, taking with him the CIA's deputy director, Stephen Kappes, an seasoned spy and longtime Asia hand who had served in Pakistan. This was not a cordial call. Musharraf's intelligence services were, and still are, in shambles. Officials don't know who is loyal to Musharraf and who is loyal to jihadits in Pakistan, and this limits their effectiveness. Musharraf clearly lacks the human intelligence to get close to Al Qaeda without seeing his own troops slaughtered. So, one has to conclude that Kappes was there to provide the Pakistani president with more than moral support. The CIA is giving him intelligence, likely helping him understand who in his own country is trying to kill him, and to help Musharraf deal with the tribal areas. (Apparently this strategy hasn't been terribly effective, if the intelligence community's own judgment is that Al Qaeda is strong again.)

At the same time Cheney and Kappes were meeting with Musharraf, senior intelligence officials were briefing reporters on the growing threat of Al Qaeda in Pakistan, telling them that the organization had replenished its middle ranks. Intelligence indicated that the foiled British planes bombing plot the previous year had an operational link to the resurgent group, they said.

Fast forward to this month. The New York Times reported that, in 2005, the Pentagon called off a clandestine U.S. strike in the tribal areas aimed at capturing Al Qaeda officials. Then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld worried that the strike--which apparently had ballooned into a full-fledged invasion when military planners demanded security cover--would jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan relations. But in leaking this story two years later, the message to Musharraf from the Pentagon and the intelligence community was clear: We hesitated then, we won't now.

That brings us to this week's NIE, which put the official stamp on what we've known for months. A few days before its release, the intelligence community's top analyst publicly briefed members of Congress on the substance of the Pakistan problem.

Taken together, this build-up in U.S. anxiety--first expressed in surprise visits by top officials, now playing out in congressional testimony and public intelligence documents--signals that the Bush administration is dispensing with its light-touch strategy. It was that approach that kept thousands of combat troops from descending into the tribal areas in 2005. This has been replaced by tough public rhetoric and an undercurrent of hostility.

One has to wonder if the administration thinks the time for words has past. Is the United States moving towards its own military solution to Al Qaeda in Pakistan? The administration has stayed off that course for fear it would so badly destabilize Musharraf that he would lose his grip on power, with disastrous consequences for American interests. Well, the country appears to be sliding into instability, so perhaps one objection has gone away. But if Al Qaeda really has re-charged its batteries, and is more capable of striking out from Pakistan today than it has been in years--which is now the official line--then the administration might think it has no choice but to strike, if Musharraf won't.

It sounds implausible given the administration's cautious strategy to date. But consider what would happen if an Al Qaeda cell linked to Pakistan mounts a devastating attack in the United States. The United States would respond with full force, a la Afghanistan in 2002. Is the administration prepared to wait for that moment? I think that you can read between lines of the past several months and conclude, "Probably not."

Labels: CIA, Homeland Security, Pakistan, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Thursday, July 19, 2007

Homeland Security's rapid exodus

My colleague at Government Executive magazine, Katherine McIntire Peters, has a good story about the exodus of senior officials in the Homeland Security Department's upper ranks.

Senior Homeland Security Department employees left their jobs over the past two years at rates significantly higher than the average for other Cabinet-level departments, according to a report released Monday by the Government Accountability Office.

Attrition rates for Homeland Security's Senior Executive Service positions or those requiring presidential appointment were 14.5 percent in 2005 and 12.8 percent in 2006, the report (GAO-07-758) stated. That's more than twice the average attrition at all Cabinet-level departments of 7 percent and 6 percent during the same years.

Over the past several weeks, we've seen a procession of stories about leadership woes at DHS, which are intensified by the pending transition of power from the Bush administration to the next president, in January 2009. I wrote about this issue in National Journal last month. Then Congress and the Washington Post noted the preponderance of vacant posts in DHS' upper echelons.

Katherine's story on this latest GAO report sheds even more light on the problem. In the past two years, more than half of the senior employees at DHS headquarters in Washington "either resigned or transferred to another department," she reports. In light of employee satisfaction surveys that put DHS at or near the bottom in most categories, one can imagine that a good number of these employees left not just because they got new jobs, but because they wanted out of DHS. "Executives at headquarters, the Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Emergency Management Agency had the highest attrition rates," Katherine reports. Those three organizations, perhaps more than any others in the department, have suffered from low morale, bad publicity, and frequent turnover at the top.

Turnover was also higher than the government average among career, non-senior DHS employees--8.4 percent in 2005 and 7.1 percent in 2006. The overall average for federal agencies was 4 percent. Most of these numbers were accounted for by security screeners at airports, who make up more than one-third of the total DHS workforce. Factoring them out, DHS' numbers for non-senior employees' attrition fell below the federal average. Of course, the fact that there's so much turnover among the people charged with keeping terrorists and bombs off of airplanes might give overseers some pause.

Labels: Homeland Security, Management, Politics, Transition of Power

Shane Harris | Tuesday, July 17, 2007

Intelligence Estimate: No new news...but one intriguing message

There are no real surprises in the unclassified "key judgments" of a new National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism, out this morning. Most of the important assessments of the 16 intelligence agencies have already leaked out or were highlighted in other forums by senior officials in recent months.

We judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al-Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities.

Again, no surprises. The estimate does point out, echoing testimony by the country's top intelligence analyst last week, that Al Qaeda has "protected or regenerated key elements of hits Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)..."

In all, the one-and-a-half pages of unclassified nuggets aren't any more specific than what intelligence officials have put out for public consumption in the past year.

But there was one tantalizing bit at the end. The estimate seemed to say that the intelligence agencies need to better position themselves to counter the Internet as a tool for terrorism. In a section devoted to "technological advances" (read: the Internet, communications technologies, etc.) that continue to let "even small numbers of alienated people find and connect with one another, the authors drop this paragraph:

The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment
will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt
plots. It will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local
level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of
terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.

Let me read between the lines here a bit. "The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment..." Here, they're talking about picking up on the signals of an attack--online chatter, rhetoric on jihadi Web sites, but also message traffic, probably money transfers. We've known for a long time that the intelligence agencies focus on the Web and online transactions to detect terrorist patterns.

But to the second point, this "will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt plots;" that strikes me as a pretty candid admission. It's not like the intelligence agencies are saying, "We can't detect plotting on the Internet," but they're clearly pointing out this is an area of concern, and one that's going to keep putting counterterrorism specialists through their paces.

In light of this challenge, the agencies will need "greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information." This strikes me as a clear reference to the use of fusion centers, which are supposed to marry local intelligence with the global threat picture. This could be seen as a shot at the Homeland Security Department. Theoretically, it's DHS' job to put those two pieces together--local and global--but it has never really worked out that way. Most of this integration goes on at the National Counterterrorism Center, and the intelligence agencies hold sway there. The fusion centers themselves, while nominally under DHS' purview, are, in my experience, FBI-led affairs, with strong ties to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. It's not clear whether this part of the estimate could be read as a move to underscore that this intelligence fusion is really the intelligence community's job, or as a signal to DHS that they need to step into this role more forcefully. I have to conclude, though, based on my reporting, that it's the former. This is a clear signal that the intelligence community sees fusion centers, and in the integration of local, national, and global threat reporting, as a vital part of domestic security.

Finally, the estimate says the intelligence agencies must understand "how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions." That's the false-positive, false-negative challenge in a nut shell. How do you scan all this activity--whether online or in the physical world--and determine what is and isn't suspicious? This is an area of particular interest for me, and I've been writing about it for years. I think it's most interesting that, in an NIE devoted to terrorist threats to the Untied States, officials chose to point out this challenge. Clearly, it weighs heavily on their minds.

Labels: Director of National Intelligence, Fusion Centers, Homeland Security, Pakistan, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Tuesday, July 17, 2007

The Terrorism Enhancement: The story behind the story

I stumbled onto the terrorism enhancement story several months ago while reporting on another one: the National Security Agency's terrorist surveillance program. I learned about a trial of so-called "eco-terrorists" in Eugene, Oregon, part of the FBI's Operation Backfire against the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front. After lawyers for the defendants for Daniel McGowan, whom I write about in the lead of my story, and his fellow defendants learned that the NSA was monitoring terrorist communications inside the United States without warrants, their lawyers wanted to know if the government had intercepted any of their clients' information. Theoretically, if the government had used warranties wiretaps to secure their indictments--"fruit of the poisonous tree"--it could jeopardize the case. Prosecutors insisted they hadn't used warrantless surveillance information, and for a time it seemed that the government would have to prove that to the judge. Fast-forwarding a bit, the matter ultimately became moot when defendants struck a plea bargain.

It seemed like the NSA angle wouldn't pan out. But something else intrigued me. I learned that the prosecutors were pursuing a "terrorism enhancement" to the defendants' sentences. I've been covering counterterrorism for six years, but I had never heard of this law, which is contained in the same part of the the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that covers hate crimes and other "victim-related adjustments."

Why was the government pursuing a terrorism enhancement against environmental activists? And who else had they sought it against? That question led me into a months-long investigation that culminated in my current feature story.

Just figuring out how many times the government had sought the enhancement proved impossible--the U.S. Attorneys Office doesn't track that figure. But I was able to determine that judges have applied the enhancement at least 57 times in the past eight years. I studied more than half those cases--35--and learned that prosecutors sought the enhancement more often against domestic defendants, as opposed to members of international terrorist groups.

Labels: Homeland Security, Law, Terrorism

Shane Harris | Friday, July 13, 2007

DHS "well on our way" to preparing for transition

In a discussion about surveillance cameras in New York City this morning, Diane Rehm devoted some air time to turnover and vacancies in the senior ranks of the Homeland Security Department. (See yesterday’s post.) DHS Spokesman Russ Knocke joined by phone, and said that, in April, the department was permitted to hire an additional 73 senior level positions. Officials are trying to “cross-train” them with existing employees, so that they’re ready to take over in January 2009, when a new administration comes in, he said. “We need high-caliber leaders in these spots, and we believe we’re well on our way to getting there."

When I interviewed DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson back in May, he gave some more specifics. He acknowledged that it hadn’t been easy to keep good help. "We've had a significant turnover," he said. "And that turnover has been below the top-level jobs as well." (A number of those positions remain vacant, according to a new House Homeland Security Committee report.) But, Jackson said, preparations for the transition are well under way. "I would say we are well beyond the halfway point in what we have to get done."

Also on the show today, former DHS Inspector General Clark Kent Ervin said he was distressed by the high turnover and vacancies. “I think it’s troubling, really, that there are so many high-level positions at [DHS] that are open,” he said. Ervin also noted that, compared to other departments, the vacancies are “unusually high” at DHS. Why? Ervin cited a confluence of factors. “The department has the lowest morale” of any in government. It has “been underfunded since the beginning.” (Ervin noted that he’s a conservative Republican “who typically does not call for greater government spending.”) And Ervin pointed out that, in the wake of high-profile disasters like Hurricane Katrina, it hasn’t been easy to attract and retain a lot of talent at DHS. It won’t be any easier given that the Bush administration’s final days in office are upon us, he added.

Of the recent terrorist plot in London, Ervin emphasized that it was no coincidence the strikes came during a governmental transition, from former Prime Minister Tony Blair to new PM Gordon Brown. He also reminded listeners that terrorists blew up commuter trains in Madrid three days before the national elections in 2004. (I discussed this significance of this pattern, and what it means for DHS, in my story on the upcoming transition.

Knocke said DHS officials “are mindful of recent events in London,” and “the timeliness of attacks [in Madrid].” That echoed Jackson’s sentiments. The deputy secretary told me that the possibility of a terrorist attack timed to the U.S. transition in 2009 factors into officials planning now.

Labels: Homeland Security, Management, Transition of Power

Shane Harris | Tuesday, July 10, 2007

Trouble in DHS' Upper Ranks

A congressional report out this morning leads off with a story I wrote about the Homeland Security Department's reliance on politically appointed leaders.

Spencer Hsu has a good piece in this morning's Washington Post about that report and the administration's failure to fill about a quarter of the top leadership posts at DHS, "creating a 'gaping hole' in the nation's preparedness for a terrorist attack or other threat, according to a congressional report to be released today." Spencer references my previous story, as well.

"The DHS has one of the largest rosters of senior political appointees in the federal government, in part because of how it was created. The DHS says it has never had more than 220 senior political appointees, although the Office of Personnel Management told Congress of more than 360 in 2004, National Journal reported last month."

The Wall Street Journal's Informed Reader picked up on my story, too, last month. You can also listen to an interview I did with Federal News radio about DHS' political appointees.

Labels: Homeland Security, Management, Media Notes and Appearances, Politics

Shane Harris | Monday, July 09, 2007