I have a story in today's National Journal about the remarkable reaction to the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear weapons program. As I reported this story, I was struck by the degree of confusion around the NIE's key judgments, stemming largely from how they were written.
There are still many more questions to answer. But the fact that so many thoughtful people are expressing concern about what this NIE really means, and what has happened since it was released, gives this document a new level of significance. It has also fundamentally altered the United States' posture towards Iran, in ways that we're only beginning to understand.
Labels: Director of National Intelligence, Iran
Saying he wanted "to be very clear in addressing the Iranian nuclear capability," Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell told a Senate committee today that Iran continues down a path that could lead to construction of a nuclear weapon. Reiterating what appears to be a coordinated line of thinking, McConnell said that Iran is still enriching uranium and building missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. These are two of the three legs in the stool of Iran's nuclear ambitions.
While not refuting the judgment of his intelligence agencies that Iran halted the third leg, a set of covert, military-run nuclear weapons activities, McConnell clearly wanted to tamp down the dramatic headline of the recent National Intelligence Estimate, which gave the strong impression that Iran's nuclear program is, at least temporarily, on ice.
We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities, as well as its covert military uranium conversion and enrichment-related activities, for at least several years. Because of intelligence gaps, [the Department of Energy] and the [National Intelligence Council] assess with only moderate confidence that all such activities were halted. We assess with moderate confidence that Tehran had not restarted these activities as of mid-2007, but since they comprised an unannounced secret effort which Iran attempted to hide, we do not know if these activities have been restarted.For good measure, McConnell added, "I note again that two activities relevant to a nuclear weapons capability continue: uranium enrichment that will enable the production of fissile material and development of long-range ballistic missile systems."
This is now the official counterargument to the NIE. The fact that these statements come from the man who is ultimately responsible for that document is, as best I can tell, unprecedented.
Labels: Director of National Intelligence, Iran
The list is growing. Israel has now come out against the United States' National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, declaring that the country is three years away from obtaining offensive nuclear capabilities. Mossad chief Meir Dagan presented that assessment to a Knesset committee Monday, and added that the NIE "pulls the rug out from under" attempts to halt the Iranian program diplomatically, "leaving Israel to face the threat alone."
Who is out there actually defending the NIE? Israel now joins the French, the President of the United States, and the U.S. Director of National Intelligence in concluding that Iran is still on the path to a nuke, despite the NIE's judgment that Iran halted its nuclear weaponization program years ago. Like the other NIE skeptics, Israel homes in on two key pillars of a nuclear program, including uranium enrichment and ballistic missile construction, and concludes that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are alive and thriving. (President Bush made this case publicly, as well.)
Israel's departure with the NIE differed in that it rebuked the document itself as diplomatically counterproductive, something that, so far, only staunch critics of the intelligence community in the United States have done. Israel’s reaction is hardly surprising, of course, given its particularly precarious position in the region, and its long-standing insistence that Iran is either close or very close to developing a nuclear weapon.
But the fact that Israel is now on record against the U.S. conclusion is an important development, and could signal the start of a new international alliance, backed by President Bush himself, against the NIE’s conclusion, which will continue to be painted as rosy, overly optimistic, and fundamentally off-the-mark because it doesn’t rank the enrichment and missile programs highly enough in the final calculation. Will the authors of the NIE defend their work again, as they did so forcefully when their key judgments were declassified late last year? Stay tuned.
In the meantime, here’s something from the vault on Israel’s historic insistence that Iran was practically within reach of a nuke. In October 2006, I sat in on a meeting between then-Congressman Curt Weldon, a Pennsylvania Republican, and Daniel Ayalon, then Israel’s ambassador to the United States. (I was writing a profile of Weldon, and the two men had previously scheduled this meeting in Weldon's office.) The conversation turned to Iran's nuclear ambitions, a topic that had possessed Weldon's interest. Like the Israelis, he insisted that Iran was closer to a weapon than most people thought, and that the United States perilously underestimated the regime.
Weldon told Ayalon that Iran would have a nuclear weapon in two years. A military attaché who had accompanied Ayalon to the meeting replied, with a smile, "We say less." It was a chilling moment, in and of itself. But it also stood out because, at the time, such a dire assessment was at odds with most experts' opinion, as well as the judgment of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies. They estimated then that Iran's weapons program was at least five years from maturity and probably more, given Iran's difficulty producing the necessary materials for a bomb. It's worth noting that, around the time of this meeting, the intelligence community would have been in the early stages of its reassessment of the Iranian program, which resulted in last year's NIE and the about-face on the previous assessment.
Labels: CIA, Director of National Intelligence, Iran
So now, in addition to the Director of National Intelligence, and the President of the United States, add the French government to the dissent column on the explosive National Intelligence Estimate on
Herve Morin, the French defense minister, was in Washington yesterday, and he said that “coordinated information from a number of intelligence services leads us to believe that
The French dissent is significant on a number of levels. First,
Second, note that Morin said “a number of intelligence services” had provided information that led France not to concur with the United States’ key judgments—ones, it should be noted, that the president sought to distance himself from the very day they were declassified.
The Russian and Chinese governments—whose support for sanctions is key at the United Nations—haven’t come out in opposition to the NIE, but it doesn’t hurt President Bush’s case to keep up the pressure by having a key European ally come over to his side, especially one that feels threatened by Iran. The United Nations Security Council this week considered a new proposal from the
Labels: Director of National Intelligence, Iran, Politics
President Bush offered fresh evidence in his State of the Union address last night that not all decision-makers share the intelligence community's view on Iran's nuclear ambitions. Although he was remarkably restrained in his rhetoric--particularly in comparison to years past--Bush homed in on Iran's uranium enrichment and ballistic missile programs to remind us that the country still poses a mortal threat.
Tehran is also developing ballistic missiles of increasing range and continues to develop its capability to enrich uranium, which could be used to create a nuclear weapon. [Note: The recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program doesn't contradict him on this point.] ... Our message to the leaders of Iran is also clear: Verifiably suspend your nuclear enrichment, so negotiations can begin. And to rejoin the community of nations, come clean about your nuclear intentions and past actions, stop your oppression at home and cease your support for terror abroad. But above all, know this: America will confront those who threaten our troops, we will stand by our allies and we will defend our vital interests in the Persian Gulf.
The NIE concluded that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, but it narrowly defined said program as "Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work," as well as its covert work to convert and enrich uranium. In other words, this assessment does not cover Iran's civilian enrichment work, which holds so-called "breakout potential" for a weapons program, nor does it cover work on building a missile to deliver a bomb. Still, it seems the community's view is that a full weapons program cannot come to fruition without the key weaponization piece.
The president, though, clearly thinks otherwise, and he's not alone. No less than the Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, said recently that he thinks--apparently despite the NIE's findings--that Iran is on the path to obtaining a nuclear weapon.
This all could be evidence of a high-level split between the intelligence community and its customers. But there's another possibility. Intelligence is a special policy input, but it is, in the end, just one input. It's usually a mistake to take any single NIE or intelligence stream as dispositive. The president learned that painful lesson in the run-up to war in Iraq. Some might find it refreshing that this administration, even if in its final days, is not once again hanging its policy towards a key Middle Eastern country on inherently murky intelligence. It just may be that this time the country in question actually does have nuclear weapons, despite what the intelligence community believes.
Labels: Director of National Intelligence, Iran, Politics
Lawrence Wright of The New Yorker has a new (very long) piece on DNI Mike McConnell, the culmination of an apparently extraordinary level of access and series of intimate interviews. (Wright and McConnell ate together and flew once on the DNI's private plane.)
While I hate to say the piece didn't do much to illuminate McConnell's character, it also may have buried the lead. In the third to last paragraph of the 18-page article, the DNI drops what I consider a mini-bombshell: He thinks that Iran "is on the path to get a nuclear weapon."
That assessment stands in contrast to the intelligence community's official, coordinated judgment that Iran shut down its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003. That was the remarkable turn-about contained in the unclassified key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which McConnell released--after publicly vowing not to--last month.
Now, the NIE was uncertain about whether Iran was restarting its nuclear weapons program, and it certainly left open the possibility, but it seems to me a dramatic public pronouncement for the DNI to say he personally believes there's no doubt about Iran's intentions.
Here's the passage in question from Wright's article.
When we last spoke, McConnell said, 'There’s no doubt in this observer’s mind that Iran is on the path to get a nuclear weapon. It will force an arms race in the region.'As Wright chronicles in his piece, McConnell has recently shown a tendency to say things off-the-cuff that turn out to be not quite accurate, but this statement is rather emphatic. Indeed, the term "no doubt" is a much bolder assertion than the intelligence community's mark of "high confidence," used in NIEs to indicate that the assessment is based on high-quality information. One has to presume that, as the nation's top intelligence official, McConnell has access to the very best information. So what does he know that we don't after reading the NIE?
For background on the build-up to the NIE's release, see my story from National Journal last month, "The Other About Face on Iran."
Labels: Director of National Intelligence, Iran
My initial take on the Iran NIE.
Labels: Director of National Intelligence, Iran, Media Notes and Appearances